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WHY SOME COUNTRIES THRIVE DESPITE CORRUPTION 
The Role of Trust on the Corruption-Efficiency Relationship 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
While it is widely accepted that corruption negatively affects economic growth, why some 
countries achieve rapid growth under rampant corruption remains a puzzle. We shed light on this 
issue by examining the role of trust in the corruption-efficiency relationship.  We argue that in 
countries with a relatively high level of trust, corruption tends to be more “efficiency enhancing” 
than corruption in countries with a relatively low level of trust, which tends to be more 
“predatory” and thus, inefficient. To illustrate our arguments, we first conduct a qualitative 
comparative case study of China and the Philippines. We then further subject our ideas to a 
quantitative test using a pooled data set of 65 countries in two time periods.  Both our case study 
and statistical test support our general hypothesis that trust mitigates the negative effect of 
corruption on economic growth. 
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WHY SOME COUNTRIES THRIVE DESPITE CORRUPTION 
The Role of Trust on the Corruption-Efficiency Relationship 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is a global issue that transcends national boundaries. Governments of virtually 
all countries are trying to eliminate it, either sincerely or at least nominally.  It is commonly 
believed that corruption distorts the allocation of resources by diverting much needed capital for 
economic development to corrupt officials’ pockets (Svensson, 2003). Thus a high-level 
corruption in a country is detrimental to its economic growth.   
However, empirical evidence for this relationship seems to be mixed (Svensson, 2003).  
For example, a visual examination of data on corruption and economic performance across 
countries provides no clear relationship between these two variables. On the one hand, if we 
make a simple plot (Figure 1) to view the relationship between the level of economic 
development measured by income per capita and perceived corruption level across countries, the 
negative relationship is quite strong: poor countries tend to be corrupt (Transparency 
International, 2007; World Bank, 2007).1
China provides such a case. Both domestic public opinion polls in China and surveys by 
international organizations show that the level of corruption in China is high, deeply rooted, and 
widespread (Transparency International, 2007). In spite of the rampant corruption, the Chinese 
economy has been growing rapidly, with an average annual growth rate of approximately 10 
percent.  Moreover, China is not alone; there are other countries that have relatively high 
corruption and economic growth rates.  Presumably, one can argue that this is because there are 
many factors that affect economic growth and corruption is only one of them. However, we are 
  On the other hand, if we examine the relationship 
between perceived corruption level and economic growth rate across countries, we will get an 
interesting and mixed picture: it seems that growth rates diverge more for countries with high-
level corruption. In other words, while many highly corrupt countries have low economic growth 
rates, there are countries that have achieved rapid economic growth under rampant governmental 
corruption (Figure 2).  This at least suggests that some countries may achieve high economic 
performance despite high corruption. 
                                                 
1 While the causal relationship between corruption and economic growth may go both ways, at the very least, it is 
reasonable to argue that in the long run, persistently corrupt countries fail to develop. 
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not satisfied with this argument, because the observation that all the poorest countries are highly 
corrupt (Figure 1) does suggest that corruption hurts economic growth in the long run.    
(Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here) 
This poses an important puzzle to not only scholars of international business, but also the 
society in general and the policy makers in particular: why corruption seems to be more harmful 
to some countries and less harmful to others for their economic growth?  
Scholars first tried to solve this puzzle by constructing various theories of corruption. 
Broadly speaking, there are two major theoretical streams on the role of corruption on economic 
growth.  One stream argues that corruption is pure waste and thus bad for economic growth 
(Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Choi and Thum, 1998; Svensson, 2003). The other argues 
that under a political and economic environment where regulations are extremely rigid and anti-
business, corruption (and bribery) may serve as lubricant to circumvent stifling regulations and 
thus conducive to economic growth (the “efficiency-enhancing corruption”) (Leff, 1964; Lui, 
1985; Wedeman, 2002).  While both theories are internally consistent and make sense, empirical 
evidence does not seem to support either. 
A weakness in the previous studies is the inability to systematically distinguish the more 
“efficiency-enhancing” corruption from the more “predatory” corruption by identifying some 
moderating factor(s) that may alter the circumstances in which the effect of corruption on 
economic efficiency can be more harmful or less harmful on economic efficiency.  Presumably, 
we could imagine that some countries tend to have more “efficiency-enhancing” corruption, 
while other countries tend to be plagued by “predatory” corruption. If this is the case, without 
being able to identify the factors that may determine the type of corruption, then the overall 
effect of corruption on economic growth across countries may be obscured, with the “efficiency-
enhancing” and “predatory” effects canceling each other, thus failing to support either view. 
We propose a new perspective to address this puzzle.  We argue that a major factor that 
may systematically distinguish countries with predominantly “efficiency-enhancing” corruption 
from countries with predominantly “predatory” corruption is the level of generalized trust in a 
society. In a society with a generally high level of public trust, corruption tends to be efficiency-
enhancing (or less harmful to economic growth), whereas in a society that lacks trust, corruption 
tends to be predatory (or more harmful to economic growth). 
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This argument seems to be contradictory: corruption and bribery are dishonest and 
immoral behaviors, whereas trust usually has the connotation of honesty and high morality. In 
this article, we will first review the literature on corruption, develop our argument, which 
paradoxically suggests a complementary relationship between corruption and trust, on how both 
interact to affect economic efficiency, and use a case study and a statistical test to support our 
argument. 
CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The literature on corruption is multidisciplinary, rich and growing.  Scholars from 
virtually every discipline in the social sciences and business schools study it ( e.g., Jain (2001), 
Rodriguez, et.al. (2006), and Svensson (2003)).  For our study, we will restrict our literature 
review to the effect of corruption on economic growth across countries. 
As briefly mentioned earlier, there are two contrasting views on the effect of corruption 
on economic growth. One school, which may be termed as the “efficiency enhancing” view, 
argues that under certain conditions, corruption may improve the efficiency of government 
bureaucracy (Leff, 1964). If a country’s political system is characterized by long and 
complicated business approval process, and the laws and regulations are anti-business and rigid, 
then paying bribes to officials to circumvent the bureaucracy will improve the efficiency of 
business and thus help the economy to grow.  This is the so-called “grease-the-wheels-of-
bureaucracy” argument for corruption. Lui (1985) develops a queuing model demonstrating that 
if corrupt officials award business licenses or contracts according to the size of bribes, and more 
efficient firms can offer larger bribes to get the license or contracts, then such corruption is 
efficiency enhancing and resources can achieve optimal allocation.   
Other scholars are skeptical of the “efficiency enhancing” view. The main criticism is 
that the efficiency enhancing view treats rigid bureaucracy and anti-business regulations as given.  
However, in most countries with high corruption, the officials have strong incentive to make the 
regulations more rigid so that they can demand more bribes.  In this regard, the critics argue that 
both corruption and rigid regulation are symptoms of other underlying factors (Kaufmann and 
Wei, 2000; Svensson, 2005). Furthermore, we should point out that Lui’s model implicitly 
assumes that a corrupt official is comfortable accepting bribes from anyone, including people 
they don’t know well. This is not realistic, since the risk of accepting bribes from a stranger is 
high in a society with little trust. It is more likely that a corrupt official chooses to only accept 
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bribes from related people to reduce the risk of being turned in, which may lead to sub-optimal 
allocation of resources. 
The argument that corruption negatively affects economic growth is primarily based on 
resource allocation.  Corrupt officials may select and approve projects that are easy to extort 
bribery, rather than the ones that can create the largest economic welfare for the society (Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1991, 1993). These corrupt officials tend to award contracts to firms that 
are willing to lower quality and use the savings to pay a higher bribe to get the business, 
encouraging inefficient firms (Rose-Ackerman, 1977).  Responding to a corrupt environment, 
firms may try to avoid long-term, irreversible investment, and opt for “fly-by-night” technology 
to guard against future escalation in bribe demand (Choi and Thum, 1998; Svensson, 2003). 
Corruption can also drag down economic growth by diverting entrepreneurial talents from 
productive works (such as starting new businesses) to unproductive works (e.g., seeking 
government jobs) (Svensson, 2005). Despite the theoretical efforts in understanding the impact 
of corruption on the economy, empirical testing is inconclusive on this issue (Svensson, 2005). 
THE IMPACT OF TRUST ON CORRUPTION 
Corruption is illegal in almost all societies, at least nominally. Thus an important factor in 
taking bribers is the risk of being caught. Scholars have studied the probability of being caught in 
corrupt activities (e.g., Becker, 1968). However, there does not seem to be any study on the 
systematic variations, or patterns, in the probability of being caught across countries, except the 
general notion that in a more corrupt society, bribery and corruption tend to be perceived less 
dangerous and more acceptable (such as “this is the only way to do things here”) (Jain, 2001). 
In this regard, we argue that one important factor that has been overlooked is the level of 
trust. Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) are among the first to argue that trust, or social 
capital, affect economic performance.  Later on, La Porta et al. (1997) argue that trust promotes 
cooperation, which in turn promotes economic performance, and provide statistical evidence to 
support their argument. We further argue that trust promotes cooperation between corrupt 
officials and bribers.  
Trust is important in bribery-corruption relationship, because the time lag and geographic 
separation between the bribe payment to the corrupt official and delivery of the public good to 
the briber.  This is especially true in large scale corruptions involving government contracts or 
market access worth hundreds of millions of dollars (Whereas petty corruption such as paying a 
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police official to cancel a ticket for traffic violation may be accomplished on the spot). A key 
issue in any economic transaction is: Should the briber pay first, or should the official deliver the 
goods first?  If there exists a high-level trust between the briber and the official, it is less of a 
concern. Otherwise, the deal cannot be done since there is very little legal protection for bribery-
corruption relationship. 
Suppose there are two types of societies in terms of the level of trust between strangers: 
society A has a very high level of public trust, whereas society B has virtually no public trust. In 
society A, people tend to trust each other, corrupt officials feel comfortable taking bribes from 
almost anyone, because the likelihood of being turned in by the bribe giver is very low. 
Furthermore, whether the briber pays first or the official delivers first is not a major issue, since 
they trust each other. Thus, it can be logically argued that in society A, there is an extensive and 
efficient bribe-taking corruption market; corrupt officials will sell the public goods (contracts or 
market access) to the highest bidder who has the most efficient firm (approximating the 
“efficiency enhancing” hypothesis). In essence, bribers pay and officials deliver. 
In society B, people are highly suspicious of each other, and corrupt officials only accept 
bribes from people they know well, such as their relatives and longtime friends. In these close 
relationships, the time lag between payment and deliver is not a big problem. But such 
transactions are only limited to a small number of people. If corruption is rampant in society B, 
then it implies that corrupt officials must extract bribes from strangers.  But with strangers, the 
time lag and geographic separation (such as delivering the public goods in one city and paying 
bribes in another city) becomes a difficult issue. Since there is little trust and thus no guarantee 
that the official will deliver, then potential bribers will not pay upfront. Likewise, the official will 
not deliver without payment first. The likelihood of closing a bribe-taking deal is further reduced 
because there is a risk of being turned in, coupled with the threat of future extortion, between 
strangers with low level of trust. However, if corruption is rampant in such society, it then 
implies that officials control most resources and have absolute authority to extract payment from 
ordinary citizens and private firms.  Then corruption becomes predatory, a pure extortion that 
does not deliver value to either the briber or the society and hence, economic growth. 
What countries tend to have a higher level of public trust?  Literature on trust suggests 
that public trust can be nurtured and positively re-enforced by good political and economic 
institutions (La Porta et al., 1997).  More pertinent to our study, public trust in a society is a 
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culture (commonly observed social norms and values) that is formed during long history of 
“horizontal networks of association” (Putnam, 1993) between people in social, economic, and 
political exchanges. In this regard, voluntary (or informal) social network can be viewed as a 
governance mechanism that use private relations, rather than official laws or regulations, to 
conduct and protect business and other social interests including property rights (Li & Filer, 
2007).  Imagine that in a society in which people tend to make great effort to cultivate personal 
relationships and build private networks (more like society A in our earlier example), person X 
tends to place a higher level of trust on person Y, who X does not know well, as long as X’s 
personal network reaches Y through connections.  (In other words, if Y cheats X, X can always 
rely on his/her network to punish Y.)  A logical interpolation is that in this society, the level of 
public trust tends to be higher as a result of the society’s heavy reliance on personal network.2
Based on the above discussion, we propose that in countries with a more expansive, 
stronger, and thicker social network, as reflected in the higher level of public trust, bribery-
corruption relations tend to be more extensive (more people participating) and efficient in the 
sense that the briber pays and the corrupt official delivers the public goods (such as licenses, 
permissions, or contracts) to the briber in need, thus facilitating business activities and economic 
growth.  In contrast, in countries with weak social networks, as evidenced in a low-level of 
public trust, bribery-corruption relations tend to be limited to a small number of closely related 
people (such as family members or long-time friends), who may not be necessarily the most 
efficient users of the public goods they receive as a result of their bribe. The bribe payment by 
strangers will degenerate into pure extortion (as our example society B shows), producing a 
deadweight loss to the briber and no efficiency gain for the economy. More formally, we have 
 
Hypothesis 1: Corruption has a negative effect on economic growth, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 2: Trust has a positive effect on economic growth, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of corruption on economic growth is moderated by trust. There is an 
interaction effect between corruption and trust on economic growth. In 
countries with a higher level of trust, the negative effect of corruption will be 
mitigated. 
                                                 
2 In our study, we treat the reliance on personal network and its measurement (trust) as exogenous. Discussing the 
determinants of the development of personal networks or trust is beyond the scope of our study. Interested readers 
may refer to Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), La Porta et al. (1997), Child (2001) for further discussion on trust 
and social networks. 
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 Since our argument is new and thus requires the most vigorous and comprehensive 
empirical verification available, we decide to conduct a comparative case study and a statistical 
test to see if our view is supported qualitatively and quantitatively. We first present our case 
study and then our statistical test results.  
Case Study 
The cases of China and the Philippines may illustrate our argument.  As shown in Table 1, 
both countries have similar scores in Corruption Perception Index, but are widely different in the 
level of public trust and economic growth rate, with China being high and the Philippines low on 
both measures. While we realize that China and the Philippines share some commonalities in 
corruption activities which are observed in most corrupt countries in the world, such as officials 
stealing from the state coffers and extorting the private sector, what we try to illustrate here is 
that in a comparative perspective, corruptions in China and the Philippines tend to emphasize 
different types. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Corruption in China 
China is best known for its guanxi culture and practice (Yang, 1995; Xin and Pearce, 
1996; Park and Luo, 2001; Li, Park & Li, 2004). Guanxi refers to informal social networks based 
on private relations among people.  It functions as a relation-based governance system that 
provides private means to facilitate and protect economic transactions.  Li et al. (2004) discuss 
how relation-based governance system can perform three monitoring mechanisms to ensure 
smooth economic transactions when public laws and regulations fail to provide fair and efficient 
ordering: the ex ante ability to privately check the prospective party’s history in terms honoring 
commitment; second, the interim ability to follow the progress and status of the other party after 
entering into a business deal, and the ex post ability of deterring opportunistic behavior by 
private means (such as bad-mouthing, seizing assets, or even physical threatening).  From game-
theoretical perspective, in repeated dealings, these private mechanisms can be efficient and 
effective.  Moreover, in a society with a high-level of public trust, the likelihood of cooperation 
between two people who have just met the first time (such as between potential briber and 
prospective bribe taker) is high (Kreps et al., 1982) and private governance mechanisms can be 
quite effective and efficient. 
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The corruption-growth relationship in China closely resembles such conditions. In China, 
due to the monopolistic control of most economic resources by the government, corruption is 
rampant. The widely accepted view in China is that “power cannot be deposited in a bank, so 
you had better profit from it while you can” (see, Taihang Luntan (2007)). Furthermore, the 
strong and thick social networks make the bribery-corruption relationship go beyond family 
members and close friends. A common practice in China is if a businessman needs a highly 
restricted permit from a specific government department, he would go around asking all his 
friends who might know someone in that department. Very likely, one of the friends would say, 
“I don’t know anyone there directly, but my sister-law has a co-worker who knows someone who 
has a student who is the son of a senior official in that department.”  In a society with low trust, 
such an indirect relationship is too risky to discuss bribe.  But in China, many bribery-corruption 
relationships can be established in just this way, due to its strong guanxi system, as can been 
seen in many known corruption cases, most of which  involve people beyond the extended 
family ties (see, e.g, Chinaaffairs.org (2007)). 
This high trust can be seen from the following quotation from a multinational executive 
explaining how his firm would gave a large “slush fund” to a consultant to pay bribes in China: 
“The terms of the deal was…a ten million-dollar discretionary fund. Hands off, no questions 
asked. Don’t ask [the consultant] where the money goes,…We know exactly what he was up to, 
and exactly how successful he would be…” (Gutmann, 2004, p124). 
The following bribing act is quoted from a reliable source.3
                                                 
3 This is quoted from a source who wishes to remain anonymous.  The quotation and the restaurant name can be 
verified upon request. 
 “I [the briber] invite my 
client [corrupt official] to a well-known Cantonese restaurant with several branches in Beijing. 
The meal costs an astronomical 20000 rmb [$2,400] for two. On the way out, the restaurant 
passes a gift to my client and the client is told he or she can exchange the gift for cash if he or 
she does not like it. The gift is then exchanged by my client for about 10000 rmb. I have not 
discussed any such exchanges with my client. But just in case people get the wrong impression, 
the restaurant has covered my car's license plate in the restaurant's parking lot.” This restaurant is 
known for providing such a service to facilitate bribery and corruption. Needless to say, this kind 
of bribery-corruption is only possible when there is a very high-level of trust. 
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Even the Chinese government admits that corruption in China has become quite 
innovative and very sophisticated.  According to Takungpao, a Chinese government newspaper, 
bribers and corrupt officials have invented new arrangements in the bribery-corruption 
relationship (Hu, 2006).  One of the new features can be called the “globalization” of bribe. 
Bribes are paid not in China, but outside of China, in the form of luxury homes, bank accounts, 
or gambling trips (Chinaaffairs.org, 2007). The reason that these activities and assets are outside 
of China is to reduce the risk of being caught. But the geographic and temporal separation of 
payment and delivery also means that there is a high level of trust between the briber and the 
official.  Perhaps the most interesting new feature of corruption in China is that it has taken the 
form of futures options. The briber and the official have developed an understanding: the 
incumbent official will help the briber now and will not get paid immediately. Years later, when 
the official is retired, the briber will pay him in some way. Obviously, this arrangement 
substantially reduces the risk of being caught. Again, without a high level of trust, the corrupt 
will not choose this option. 
Corruption in the Philippines 
  The case of the Philippines is very different from that of China.  Although it has a similar 
level of corruption and its income per capita is close to China’s, it has a much lower level of 
public trust and slower rate of economic growth than China (see Table 1). 
 A major type of corruption in the Philippines, at least historically, was that the head of 
the state would control the entry of an industry or simply monopolize it, and impose a tax or 
surcharge on all the products of the industry or extract a fee for entering the industry.  The head 
of the state would appoint one of his or her cronies to be in charge of the industry and steal all 
the collections from the state coffers.  To the private sector payers, these taxes, surcharges or 
fees were nothing more than a robbery, a deadweight loss in economic efficiency. The collecting 
officials simply imposed them on the payers, without facilitating or helping any business 
activities.  Furthermore, the victim of the corruption, the payers, would have no evidence with 
which to turn in the official collector, because the latter was simply executing a state order, as 
shown in the following examples of major industries in the Philippines. 
In the coconut sector in the 1970s (accounting for roughly 25% of Philippines’ export 
income), former President Ferdinand Marcos imposed a tax on all sales of coconuts and copra.  
The agency in charge of collecting this tax was headed by his close friend Manuel Conjuangco.  
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Conjuangco then used the extorted money to buy banks, which in turn funded his acquisition of 
many coconut oil pressing mills. Then he put all the tax money in a fund and used the fund to 
subsidize the mills he and Marcos controlled (Wedeman, 1997). 
 There is a similar corruption pattern in the cigarette industry.  In 1975, Marcos imposed a 
100% import duty on cigarette filers, but gave special 90% import duty reduction to the 
Philippine Tobacco Filters Corporation, a company owned by one of his close friends, Herminio 
Disini. Disini in turn supplied the filter at below market prices to Fortune Tobacco, a major 
cigarette maker owned by another Marcos ally, Lucio Tan. Together they drove the competition 
out of market and monopolized the cigarette industry (Wedeman, 1997). 
 In the sugar industry in 1974, Marcos ordered that all sugar exports be monopolized by 
the Philippine Exchange Company, which was controlled by his college friend Robert Benidicto 
(Wedeman, 1997). With the blessing of Marcos and subsidies from state funds, Benidicto 
manipulated sugar prices and took advantages of the differences between the monopolized 
domestic price and international price to profit at the expenses of sugar farmers and producers. 
 In all these corruption anecdotes in the Philippines, there was little collaboration between 
the briber (the payer of surcharges, entry fees, and other types of extortions) and the corruption 
official. The briber was forced to pay, and the official did not enhance the efficiency of the 
briber’s business. It is estimated that through these extractions, Marcos and his associates 
amassed wealth valued between $3 billion to $6 billion (Wedeman, 1997; Bhargava and 
Bolongaita, 2004).  
 The above comparative case study of corruptions in China and the Philippines 
demonstrates that the types of corruptions in China, i.e., futures options type, third party 
brokering (the restaurant example), the “no-questions asked” slash funds, requires a high level of 
trust between the briber and the bribee; Whereas in the Philippines, a high level of trust between 
the extorting official (bribee) and the extorted business people (briber) is not required and does 
not seem to exist. 
Statistical Test 
Next we perform a statistical test using a pooled data set consisting of 90 observations 
with 65 countries in two time periods (see Table 2).  A major limitation in building a testing data 
set with a large number of countries with multiple time periods is the lack of data on trust.  The 
only publicly available data on trust across countries is the data from the World Values Survey 
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conducted by Inglehart (1994-2005). We are able to obtain the two most recent waves of the 
World Values Survey, 1994-1999, and 2000-2005, and collect other variables based on the same 
time periods to construct a pooled data set (Wooldridge, 2003) for our statistical test. Table 2 
lists the countries that have non-missing variables. Detailed data and variable descriptions are 
below. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Data 
Economic growth
Our independent variables include the following. 
. This is our dependent variable. We use the average annual growth rate 
of GDP per capita to measure economic growth (World Bank, 2002). Corresponding to the two 
periods in which we have the data on trust, we use the following two time periods, 1994-1999, 
and 2000-2005. In order to reduce the effect of extreme values, we take the nature logarithm of 
average annual growth rate of GDP per capita [log(GDPpgr)] to improve linearity. 
Corruption. Our measure of corruption (CORRUPT) is adopted from the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) developed by Transparency International (1996, 2002). The original CPI 
ranges form 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (most clean). We reversed the order by multiplying (-1) so 
that a higher score means more corrupt, which is easier to interpret the test result. Corresponding 
to the two time periods, we use the CPIs in 1996 and 2002. 
Public trust
Our control variables include the following. 
. Our measure of trust comes from the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 1994-
2005), based on a question in the survey which asks: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” The answer 
is “yes” or “no.” We use the percentage of people answering “yes” as our measure of trust 
(TRUST) in a country (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; 
Li and Filer, 2007). We use data from the two most recent survey waves, 1994-1999 and 1999-
2004. 
GNI per capita. According to the literature, a major factor affecting economic growth is 
the existing level of economic development (Barro, 1997). We use the average gross national 
income per capita (GNIp) as the measure for economic development and include it in our model 
as a controlled variable. The periods of the income data are 1994-1999 and 2000-2005 (World 
Bank 2006). 
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Schooling. Studies have shown that human capital stock affects on economic growth 
(Barro, 1997). Furthermore, corrupt countries have significantly lower levels of human capital 
stock (Svensson, 2005). We thus control it in our model and use years of schooling of the total 
population aged over 15 (SCHOOL) developed by Barro and Lee (2000) to proximate it. Barro 
and Lee (2000) calculate the data every five years. We use the data in 1995 and 2000 
corresponding to the two time periods. 
Political System.  Scholars of political economy have argued that regime type, such as 
democracy and dictatorship, affects economic development, although the overall relationship 
between growth and regime type is not very clear empirically. Przeworski et al (2000) find that 
regime type does not have a significant effect on development, whereas Barro (1997) finds a 
nonlinear relationship between the two.  In our model, we control the political system 
(STATUS), adopted from Freedom House (1972-2006), which classifies the political system of a 
country into “Not Free,” “Partially Free” and “Free.” In our preliminary test, we found that there 
was no significantly different influence on economic growth between partially free and free 
countries. Thus we code STATUS as 1 if “Not Free,” and zero otherwise. Corresponding to the 
two time periods, we use status data in 1996 and 2002.  
Time Period. 
Testing Results 
As mentioned before, our pooled data are from two time periods: 1994-
1999 and 2000-2005. To reflect the fact that the population may have different distributions in 
the two different time periods, we allow the intercept to differ across the two time periods by 
including a time period dummy (TIME) (Wooldridge, 2003). We choose the first time period 
(1994-1999) as baseline, that is, TIME=0, if an observation is in 1994-1999, and TIME=1, if an 
observation is in 2000-2005. 
 We first estimate the correlation coefficients for all the variables. As expected, corruption 
is negatively correlated with the growth rate of GDP per capita and trust is positively correlated 
with the growth rate of GDP per capita.  The correlation efficient between GNI per capita and 
corruption is quite high (-0.872), causing our concern about potential multicollinearity problems 
in our subsequent regression estimates.  We thus decide to run two sets of regressions, one with 
and one without GNI per capita. 
(Insert Table 3 about here)  
The general model tested is  
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Economic growth = f (corruption, trust, corruption*trust, control variables (GNI per 
capita, Human capital stock, Political Status, Time period), error term). 
We use three specifications to test our hypotheses: Model (1a) examines the traditional 
model of the impact of corruption on economic growth, controlling for human capital stock, 
political status and time period; Model (2a) adds “trust” to Model (1a) as an additional 
independent variable to examine the influence of trust on economic growth, and Model (3a) adds 
an interaction term between corruption and trust to Model (2a). We then repeat the above models 
with one more control variable, GNI per capita (Models (1b), (2b), and (3b)). 
The results are summarized in Table 4.  All the six specifications, Model (1a) to Model 
(3b), are very consistent: corruption has a negative effect on economic growth, trust shows a 
positive sign in terms of affecting economic growth, and the interaction term is positive.  
Comparing Models 1a-3a (without GNI per capita) and Models 1b-3b (with GNI per capita), we 
find that they are similar in terms of the effects of the independent variables and explanation 
power, indicating that the relationship between economic growth, corruption, and trust are stable 
and our specifications are robust. This robustness can be seen quite clearly from Model 3a and 
Model 3b: the magnitude of coefficient estimates, the significant levels, and the R-squares are 
very close. We will thus focus on Model 3b, the model with all independent variables, to discuss 
the testing result. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
In Model (3b), the coefficient of CORRUPT is negative (-1.086) and highly significant 
(p<0.000), suggesting that corruption retards economic growth.  Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
Trust has a highly significant positive effect (1.239 with p<0.000) on economic growth, 
supporting Fukuyama’s view (1995) and our second hypothesis that a high level of trust among 
citizens accounts for the superior performance in the economy (measured by economic growth).  
The interaction term between corruption and trust is positive (1.495) and highly significant 
(p<0.000), showing that the negative effect of corruption on economic growth is reduced by a 
higher level of trust. The effect of the interaction term can be clearly seen if we rearrange Model 
(3b) as follows: 
Log (GDPpgr) = (-1.086+1.495TRUST)*CORROPT+1.239*TRUST-
.356*GNIp+.074*SCHOOL-.275*STATUS+.227*TIME +error, 
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 where the coefficient estimates are standardized and thus the variables are z-scores. (We 
use standardized coefficients to facilitate comparisons of magnitudes among the coefficients 
(Wooldridge, 2003).  
The new coefficient of corruption, (-1.086+1.495TRUST), shows that if the z-score of 
trust equals to zero, corruption has a negative effect on the z-score of economic growth by a 
magnitude of -1.086 standard deviations; if, however,  the z-score of trust is great than zero, then 
it will decreases the negative effect of corruption. A one standard deviation increase in the z-
score of trust will decrease the negative effect of corruption by 1.495 standard deviations.  These 
results show that trust moderates the effect of corruption on economic efficiency. Hypothesis 3 is 
supported. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this study, we shed light on the mystery of why some countries achieve rapid 
economic growth with rampant corruption by examining the role of trust in the corruption-
efficiency relationship. We argue that in countries with a higher level of trust, corruption tends to 
be relatively less harmful to economic growth. Our empirical analysis using both case study and 
statistical test provides support for our view.  
Before discussing the implications of our study, we want to point out that our study 
should be interpreted with caution. The conceptualization and measure of trust is far from perfect. 
Although the World Values Survey (WVS) is well designed and executed, and has been used 
extensively in studies across many disciplines, all attitude survey faces internal and external 
validity issues. In our study, as in many studies that have used the WVS data, we take the data on 
trust as given and as is universally and consistently applied to and measured in all the countries 
in the survey. Using it this way inevitably brings up the question that how can we be sure that the 
perception of trust is the same for Chinese as it is for Scandinavian?  
It is reasonable to argue that when the Chinese answer the trust question in the WVS, 
they probably view trust not as “public trust”, or trust between strangers, but as personal trust 
that is extended and supported by a vast guanxi network, which we tend to agree and which 
actually supports our proposition; Whereas the Scandinavians answering the question may mean 
the trust between totally unrelated strangers, which is closer to the notion of “public trust.”  
In our study, we do not impose what we think the trust question of the WVS measures 
based on our own perception about what citizens of a particular country may think. We believe 
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that since the question is universally asked across all countries in the sample, a reliable way to 
use it is to use it as is.  Keeping the above caution in mind, and taking our study as the empirical 
evidence suggests, we derive the following implications. 
The so-called “efficiency enhancing” corruption under a high level of trust implies that 
the official steal public goods and provides them below the official price to the briber, enabling 
the briber to improve efficiency (similar to Shleifer and Vishny’s “corruption with theft” (1993)). 
The so-called “predatory” corruption is more like “corruption without theft” in Shleifer and 
Vishny’s model, in which the bribe is an extra on top of the official price of the public good in 
question. As Shleifer and Vishny point out, corruption with theft may lower the total cost of 
business for the briber and thus the briber has little incentive to turn in the corrupt official, 
making corruption with theft is difficult to detect. 
The high level of trust (or personal reliance sanctioned by a vast informal social network) 
in societies with predominantly “efficiency-enhancing” corruption implies that cleaning 
corruption is very difficult. The strong and thick social network makes it very difficult for 
“whistle blowing.”  If this logical conjecture is true, then the prospect of eradicating corruption 
in highly relation-based countries, such as China, is less optimistic.  On the other hand, 
corruptions in societies with a low level of public trust, may, ironically, be easier to clean, since 
they absolutely dissipate values from the business and citizens. 
Another possible implication is that the “efficiency enhancing” corruption, namely, 
corrupt officials steal public goods and sell them to bribers for private gains, may have three 
consequences. First, it enriches the corrupt officials’ pockets; second, it improves the bottom line 
of private firms who bribe (which is extensive due to the high level of trust), and third, in the 
process of achieving the first two, it impoverishes the state coffers. However, while the state 
treasure is being stolen and thus may be weakened, the corrupt officials have strong incentives to 
maintain and increase the state’s political and regulative power so that they can continue to sell 
licenses and permits for their private gains. Thus, we may conjecture that under the so called 
“efficiency enhancing” corruption, the society will have a state with a strong and monopolistic 
political power, a weakened state treasure, and an efficient and wealthy business class. 
The difficulty of cleaning the “efficiency enhancing” corruption may be further 
exacerbated by the futures option type of corruption.  The time difference in bribe payment and 
public goods delivery implies that both parties, the briber and the corrupt official, have strong 
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incentive to preserve the current political order to protect their futures options. We may call it a 
“lock-in effect” of the bribery-corruption relationship. 
This poses a greater difficult ethical dilemma for MNCs entering into countries with 
“efficiency-enhancing” corruption. If before we could argument against MNCs engaging in 
bribery not only from ethical but also efficiency perspective, now the second part of the 
argument is in question because in highly relation-based societies corruption with trust may help 
efficiency, or at least may not be as harmful.  What should MNCs do under such a scenario, form 
an efficient bribery-corruption relationship so that they can effectively compete in the 
marketplace there, or resist bribing and be less competitive?  While this debate is not new, our 
study provides a new twist. Further studies in this direction are much needed to improve our 
understanding on this issue and to provide policy and strategy assistance to MNCs by 
considering the moderating role of general trust in a country on corruption and efficiency. 
At the minimum, from a practical perspective, MNC executives should be aware of the 
distinction between countries with a high level of trust and a low level of trust in terms of 
entering strategy and market expansion into a new country. They should pay sufficient attention 
to the extent of informal social network and its role in constraining or facilitating their 
interaction with the local government officials and regulations.  
References 
Barro, R. (1997) Determinants of economic growth: a cross-country empirical study, The MIT 
Press: Cambridge, Mass.  
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J. (2000) ‘International Data on Educational Attainment Updates and 
Implications’, NBER Working Paper No. 7911, National Bureau of Economic Research: 
Cambridge, MA. 
Becker, G. (1968) ‘Crime and punishment: An economic approach’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 76(2):169-217. 
Bhargava, V., and Bolongaita, E. (2004) Challenging Corruption in Asia: Case studies and 
framework for action, The World Bank: DC. 
Child, J. (2001) ‘Trust—the fundamental bond in global collaboration’, Organizational 
Dynamics, 29(4): 274-288. 
 18 
Chinaaffairs.org. (2007) section of ‘corruption of the Chinese Communist 
Party’, http://www.chinaaffairs.org/gb/forum-step1.asp?categoryID=55,  Mar 23, 2001-May 24, 
2007. (accessed May 25, 2007). 
Choi, J. P. and Thum, M. (1998) ‘Market structure and the timing of technology adoption with 
network externalities’, European Economic Review 42(2): 225-244. 
Fukuyama, F. (1995) Trust, Free Press: New York. 
Gutmann, E. (2004). Losing the New China: A Story of American commerce, desire and betrayal, 
Encounter Books: San Francisco. 
Hu, S. (2006), ‘Chinese corruption innovation’, Radio Free Asia, Nov. 24, 2006 ( in Chinese).  
Inglehart, R. (1994-2005) World Values Survey, Institute for Social Research, University of 
Michigan: Ann Arbor. 
Jain, A.K. (2001) ‘Corruption: a review’, Journal of Economic Surveys 15(1): 71-121. 
Kaufmann, D. and Wei, S.J. (2000) ‘Does 'grease money' speed up the wheels of commerce?’ 
NEBR Working Paper No.7093, National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA. 
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997) ‘Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country 
investigation’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1251-1288. 
Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. and Wilson, R. (1982) ‘Rational cooperation in the finitely 
repreated prisoner’s dilemma’, Journal of Economic Theory 27(2): 245-252 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A.  (2002) ’Government ownership of banks’, 
The Journal of Finance 57(1): 265-302. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. M. (1997) ‘Trust in large 
organizations’, The American Economic Review 87(2):333-338. 
Leff, N. H. (1964) ‘Economic development through bureaucratic corruption’, The American 
Behavioral Scientist 8(3): 8-14. 
Li, S. and Filer, L. (2007) ‘The effects of the governance environment on the choice of 
investment mode and the strategic implications’, Journal of World Business 42(1): 80-98. 
Li, S., Park, S. H., and Li, S. (2004) ‘The Great Leap Forward: The Transition From Relation-
Based Governance To Rule-Based Governance’, Organizational Dynamics 33(1):63-78. 
Lui, F.T. (1985) ‘An equilibrium queuing model of bribery’, Journal of Political Economy 
93(4):760-781. 
 19 
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1991) ‘The allocation of talent: Implications for 
growth’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(2): 503-530. 
Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1993) ‘Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth?’ 
The American Economic Review 83(2): 409-414. 
Park, S. H. and Luo, Y. (2001) ‘Guanxi and organizational dynamics: Organizational networking 
in Chinese firms’, Strategic Management Journal 22(5): 455-477.  
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (2000) Democracy and 
Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Rodriguez, P., Siegel, D. S., Hillman, A., and Eden, L. (2006) ‘Three lenses on the multinational 
enterprise: politics, corruption, and corporate social responsibility’, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 37(6): 733-746. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1977) ‘On the distribution of public program benefits between landlords and 
tenants’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 4(2):167. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1993) "Corruption", Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3): 599-
617. 
Svensson, J. (2003) ‘Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?’ Journal 
of Development Economics 70(2): 381-402. 
Svensson, J. (2005) ‘Eight questions about corruption’, Journal of economic perspectives 19(3): 
19-42. 
Taihang Luntan. (2007) ‘Youquanbushi guoqizuofei’, http://www.thlt.cn/bbs/archiver/?tid-
2694.html, Jan, 20, (Accessed May 25, 2007). 
Transparency International (1996, 2002, 2007) Corruption Perception Index, Transparency 
International: Berlin. 
Wedeman, A. (1997) ‘Looters, rent-scrapers, and dividend-collectors: Corruption and growth in 
Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines’, The Journal of Developing Areas 31(4):457-478. 
Wedeman, A. (2002) ‘Development and corruption: the East Asian paradox’, in E. D. Gomez 
(eds.) Political Business in East Asia, pp. 35-61, Routledge, London. 
 20 
Wooldridge, J. (2003) Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, South-Western College: 
Mason, Ohio. 
World Bank (2006, 2007) World development indicators, World Bank: Washington, DC. 
Freedom House (1972-2006) Freedom in the World Country Ratings, Freedom House: 
Washington, DC. 
Xin, K. R. and Pearce, J. L. (1996) ‘Guanxi: Connections as substitutes for formal institutional 
support’, Academy of Management Journal 39(6):1641-1658. 
Yang, C. C. (1995) ‘Endogenous tariff formation under representative democracy: A 
probabilistic voting model’, The American Economic Review 85(4): 956-963. 
Figure 1, Corruption and GNP per capita across countries 
 
GNIp=GNI per capita in US Dollar; CORRUPT=Corruption Perception Index, 0=most corrupt,  
-10=most clear. Source: Transparency International and World Bank. 
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Figure 2 Corruption and GDP growth rate across countries 
 
GDPpgr=GDP per capital growth rate; CORRUPT=Corruption Perception Index, 0=most corrupt, 
-10=most clear. Source: Transparency International and World Bank. 
Table 1: Corruption, trust, and economic development in China and the Philippines 
Country GDP annual 
growth rate 
(%) 
(1990-2000) 
GNI per 
capita 
(2001) 
Corruption 
perception 
index (10=best, 
1=worst) 
(2000) 
Trust 
(1999-2004) 
 
 
Philippines 3.3 1050 2.8 8.6 
China 10.3 890 3.1 54.5 
 Source: World Bank, Transparency International, and World Values Surveys 
 
 22 
 Table 2: Countries included in the statistical test 
Period 1: 1994-1999 Period 2: 1999-2004 
1 Australia       1 Argentina       24 Jordan          
2 Brazil          2 Austria         25 Korea, Rep.     
3 Chile           3 Bangladesh      26 Mexico          
4 China           4 Belgium         27 Netherlands     
5 Colombia        5 Bulgaria        28 Pakistan        
6 Czech Republic  6 Canada          29 Peru            
7 Finland         7 Chile           30 Philippines      
8 Germany         8 China           31 Poland          
9 Hungary         9 Czech Republic  32 Portugal        
10 India           10 Denmark         33 Romania         
11 Japan           11 Egypt, Arab Rep 34 Russian Federate 
12 Korea, Rep.     12 Finland         35 Singapore       
13 Mexico          13 France          36 Slovak Republic  
14 Netherlands     14 Germany         37 South Africa    
15 Norway          15 Greece          38 Spain           
16 Pakistan        16 Hungary         39 Sweden          
17 Philippines     17 Iceland         40 Tanzania        
18 Poland          18 India           41 Turkey          
19 Romania          19 Indonesia       42 Uganda          
20 Russian Federate 20 Ireland         43 United Kingdom  
21 South Africa    21 Israel          44 United States   
22 Spain           22 Italy           45 Venezuela, RB   
23 Sweden          23 Japan           46 Zimbabwe        
24 Switzerland         
25 Turkey              
26 United Kingdom      
27 United States       
28 Uruguay             
29 Venezuela, RB       
30 Vietnam                 
 
 23 
Table 3: Correlation coefficient estimates among all the variables 
 Mean S.D. GDPpgr CORRUPT TRUST GNIp SCHOOL STATUS 
CORRUPT -5.30a 2.53 -.220 
(.056) 
   
 
  
TRUST 28.86 15.53 .290* 
(.011) 
-.588** 
(.000) 
    
GNIp 12,909 12,647 .132 
(.257) 
-.872** 
(.000) 
.599** 
(.000) 
   
SCHOOL 8.04 2.29 .179 
(.123) 
-.625** 
(.000) 
.417** 
(.000) 
.627** 
(.000) 
  
 
STATUS .07 15.53 -.016 
(.893) 
.241* 
(.036) 
.146 
(.208) 
-.254* 
(.027) 
-.304* 
(.008) 
 
TIME .61 .49 .219 
(.057) 
.010 
(.928) 
-.004 
(.976) 
.042 
(.722) 
-.067 
(.568) 
.016 
(.363) 
P-values are in parentheses.  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. ** Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level. a0=most corrupt, -10=most clear.  
 
 
Table 4: Standardized coefficient estimates of regression result 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable: log(GDPpgr) 
Model 
1a 
Model 
2a 
Model 
3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b 
 
CORRUPT 
-.194 
(.184) 
-.023 
(.888) 
-.788*** 
(.003) 
-.460* 
(.053) 
-.362 
(.118) 
-1.086*** 
(.000) 
 
TRUST  
.302** 
(.046) 
1.186*** 
(.000)  
.380** 
(.013) 
1.239*** 
(.000) 
 
CORRUPT*TRUST   
1.530*** 
(.000)   
1.495*** 
(.000) 
 
GNIp    
-.339 
(.155) 
-.489** 
(.041) 
-.356** 
(.038) 
 
SCHOOL 
.065 
(.662) 
.015 
(.917) 
.026 
(.848) 
.110 
(.466) 
.067 
(.644) 
.074 
(.580) 
 
STATUS 
-.045 
(.705) 
-.146 
(.252) 
-.238** 
(.049) 
-.056 
(.638) 
-.188 
(.138) 
-.275** 
(.022) 
 
TIME 
.205* 
(.074) 
.212* 
(.060) 
.197* 
(.058) 
.226** 
(.050) 
.244** 
(.029) 
.227** 
(.027) 
N 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R Square .103 .153 .293 .129 .203 .337 
F-statistics 2.040* (.098) 
2.533** 
(.036) 
4.776*** 
(.000) 
2.071* 
(.079) 
2.936** 
(.013) 
4.936*** 
(.000) 
P-values are in parentheses.  
*Significant at the 0.10 level. **Significant at the 0.05 level, ***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
